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Abstract— Recently, a large variety of Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols have tried to eliminate the use of Bilinear 
Pairings in order to decrease complexity of computations through performing group operations over Elliptic Curves. In this 
paper we propose a novel pairing-free Key Agreement protocol over elliptic curve based algebraic groups. The results 
show that our proposed protocol is significantly less complex than related works from complexity of computation 
perspective. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental cryptographic primitive that makes a pair or group of entities able to generate a shared session key is 
named Key Agreement protocol. The importance of Key Agreement protocols in the context of Public Key 
Cryptography (PKC) is due to the fact that the shared session key is driven from exchanged key materials in unsecure 
channel. Hence, providing security in such condition is a critical challenging issue. 
In certificate-based PKC, to provide authentic public key, a Certification Authority (CA) is responsible to issue 
digital certificates. However, this type of PKC suffers from complex management of certificates (for more details refer 
to [1]). To solve mentioned problem Identity-Based Cryptography have been suggested by Adi Shamir in [2]. In 
Identity-Based PKC, the public key of users is their identity such as telephone number, image, email address and etc. 
Although the idea of Identity-Based Cryptography seems interesting, it remained impractical until 2001 that Boneh and 
Franklin could propose a fully functional Identity-Based scheme [3]. 
Followed by the mentioned work, many Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols have been proposed by the use 
of Bilinear Pairings [4-10]. Bilinear Pairings is a cryptographic function which maps two points of elliptic curve based 
algebraic groups to an element of a determined finite field [11]. High computational cost of performing Pairing 
operation led researchers proposing Pairing-Free Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols in recent years [12-15]. This 
new generation of Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols utilize cryptographic operations over elliptic curve based 
algebraic groups. In this paper we propose a Pairing-Free Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol which has better 
performance in compare with existing related works from computational cost perspective. 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as followed. In the second section, required technical backgrounds 
including Bilinear Pairings are described. Some of existing Identity- Based Key Agreement protocols are reviewed in 
Section III. We introduce our proposed Pairing-free Key Agreement protocol in the fourth section. In Section V, we 
compared our proposed protocol with some related works from efficiency viewpoint. Finally in the last section, the 
conclusion of this paper is provided. 
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
The basis of this section is representing the required technical background for the rest of this paper. The following 
subsection briefly introduces Bilinear Pairings in detail. 
 
A.   Bilinear Pairings 
 
A Bilinear Pairing is a cryptographic function such as ê: GΌ  x G΍ → Gт in which GΌ, G΍ and Gт are three algebraic 
groups with same prime order and ê is a bilinear map that has three main features “bilinearity”, ”non-degeneracy” and 
“computability”.  The first feature means that ∀P ∈ GΌ , ∀Q ∈ G΍  , ∀ɑ, b ∈ ℤq: ê(Pᵅ , Qᵇ) = ê(P, Q)ᵅᵇ   .   The second 
feature refers to this fact that if  IΌ ,  I΍   and  Iт   are identity elements  of GΌ, G΍and Gт ,  respectively,  then  “ê” do not 
map any pair of (GΌ  x G΍) to Iт  unless (IΌ, I΍). Finally, there must be an efficient algorithm for computation of ê(P, Q)  
where P and Q are the elements of GΌ and G΍, respectively. 
Due to the variety of pairing-based applications, many researches have been done in order to design efficient pairing 
maps such as well-known works Weil pairing and Tate pairing [16,17]. Design and implementation of pairing maps is 
a complex mathematical issue and this research excludes the details of this category of works. It is worth to note that 
in this research the considered Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols utilized Bilinear Pairings as a building block 
operation. 
III. RELATED WORKS 
The focus of this section is on the review of existing Identity- Based Key Agreement protocols. We categorized 
existing related works into two groups; Pairing-Based protocols and Pairing-Free ones. The following, sub-section 
reviews a Pairing-Based Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol. Then, a separated sub-section reviews a subset of 
existing Pairing-Free Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols. 
A. Pairing-Based Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol 
In this sub-section a Pairing-Based Key Agreement protocol in the context of Identity-Based PKC [10] is 
investigated. The utilized notations and assumptions are as followed: 
  q: A large prime number  G : An additive algebraic groups over Elliptic Curves  Gт: A multiplicative algebraic groups over a Finite Field  |G| = |Gт| = Iℤ*q I : The order of groups  ̂:G x G → Gт : A Bilinear Pairing  g: A generator of G  HΌ: {0,1}*  → G  :  A  one-way  collision-free  hash function  H΍:G x G → Gт : A one-way collision-free hash function  s ∈r  ℤ*q : Master-Key 
By considering that two users such as A and B wants to agree on a session key, the proposed protocol by Wang et al. 
[10] consists following phases. 
 
SETUP. In this phase, Master-Key and system   parameters (Params) will be generated after taking the considered 
security parameter.  Master-Key s ∈r  'ℤ*q  is a secret for a Trusted Third Party named  PKG ¹  while Params   
< q, G, Gт, g, ê, HΌ, H΍  >  are publicly known to all involving users. 
EXTRACTION. In this phase, each user such as � who possesses IDi identifier can refer to PKG to collect 
corresponding Private-Key. To generate the user’s Private Key, PKG first computes Qi  = HΌ (IDi ),  then generates 
di  = sQi  as the user’s Private Key and sends to the user. 
EXCHANGE.  In this phase, mentioned users do the following: 
(1) User A chooses a random tᴀ ∈r 'ℤ*q , and computes the key token Tᴀ    = tᴀQᴀ  then transfers Tᴀ    to the user B. 
(2) User B chooses a random tв ∈r 'ℤ*q , and computes the key token Tв   = tвQв  then transfers Tв    to the user A. 
COMPUTATION. In this phase, user A and user B can compute the shared secret by performing following 
computations: 
A   computes      sᴀ   = H΍(Tᴀ , Tв)   ,   sв  = H΍(Tв , Tᴀ )  and ̂ ((tᴀ + sᴀ)dᴀ, sв Qв + Tв )) 
B   computes…..sв  = H΍(Tв , Tᴀ)  ,   sᴀ   = H΍(Tᴀ, Tв )   and ̂ (sᴀQᴀ  + Tᴀ, (tв + sв )dв)) 
The final session key will be ̂ (Qᴀ , Qв )s(tᴀ+sᴀ)(tв+sв) 
 
B Pairing-Free Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols 
A subset of existing Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols that do not rely on the use of Bilinear Pairings are 
reviewed in this sub-section. Since the mentioned protocols do not require any Pairing computation, the overall 
computational cost of session key generation process is significantly lower than the Pairing-Based ones. In order to 
have a clear review we utilized same notations and assumptions in the considered protocols as followed:
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AB A   B A B B    pub 
  q: A large prime number  � q : A finite field over q  E⁄ � q : An elliptic curve over � q  G: A subgroup of E⁄ � q  s ∈r 'ℤ*q : A randomly chosen value from ℤ*q  P: A generator of the group G  IDi : Identifier of the entity �  HΌ: one-way collision-free hash  function,  where HΌ: {0,1}*  x G → ℤ*q  H΍: {0,1}* x {0,1}* x G x G x G x G x G x G x G x G →{0,1}k  where k is the number of bits for the 
prime q 
 
Followed by what mentioned above, we are going to review the considered Pairing-Free Identity-Based Key 
Agreement protocols in details. In general, mentioned protocols can be seen in four main phases named “setup”, 
“extraction”, “exchange”, and “computation”. It is worth to note that, since the two initial phases of the considered 
Pairing-Free Identity- Based Key Agreement protocols are the same, we introduced them first. Then, the consequent 
phases are reviewed separately for each protocol. 
 
SETUP. In this phase, the corresponding algorithm generates system parameters (Params) and Master-Key after 
taking the considered security parameter.  Master-Key  s ∈r  ℤ*q   is a secret for PKG while Params  
<q, � q , E⁄ � q, G, P,PPub = sP, HΌ ,H΍  > are publicly known to all involving users. 
EXTRACTION. In this phase, each user such as � who possesses IDi identifier can refer to PKG to collect 
corresponding Private-Key.  To generate the user’s Private Key,  PKG randomly chooses  ri ∈r ℤ*q , then 
computes Ri= riP ,  hi= HΌ  (IDi ,Ri )   and  si= ri + his(mod q) then returns < Ri, si  > as a Private Key to 
the user. 
After these phases users are able to agree on a session key through EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases of 
each protocol. 
 
EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases of proposed protocol by Cao et al. [14] 
 
By considering that two users such as A and B wants to agree on a session key, the proposed protocol by Cao et al. 
[14] consists of EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases as followed. 
EXCHANGE.  In this phase, mentioned users do the following: 
(1) User A chooses a random tᴀ  ∈r  ℤ*q , and computes the key token Tᴀ = tᴀP  then transfer Tᴀ, Rᴀ to the user B. 
(2) User B chooses a random tв ∈r  ℤ*q , and computes the key token Tв = tвP  then transfer Tв , Rв to the user A. 
COMPUTATION. In this phase, user A and user B can compute the shared secret as follows: 
A computes K¹   = s  T + t  (R  + h  P     )  and K ²AB   = t ᴀ Tв 
B computes K¹вᴀ = sв Tᴀ + tв(Rᴀ + hᴀPpub ) and K²вᴀ     = tв Tᴀ 
The final session key will be the output of driven function of this shared secrets and some public/private values. 
 
EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases of proposed protocol by Islam et al. [15] 
 
By considering that two users such as A and B wants to agree on a session key, the proposed protocol by Islam et al. 
[15] consists of EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases as followed. 
EXCHANGE. In this phase, mentioned users do the following: 
(1) User A chooses a random tᴀ ∈r ℤ*q, and computes the key token Tᴀ = tᴀ(Rᴀ + hᴀPpub ) then transfer Tᴀ, Rᴀ to 
the user B. 
(2) User B chooses a random tᴀ ∈r ℤ*q, and computes the key token Tв = tв(Rв  + hв Ppub ) then transfer Tв , Rв to 
the user A. 
COMPUTATION. In this phase, user A and user B can compute the shared secret as follows: 
A computes Kᴀв    =  sᴀ[Tв   + tᴀ(Rв + hвPpub )] 
B computes Kвᴀ   = sв [Tᴀ   + tв(Rᴀ  + hᴀPpub )]
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Following equation shows the equivalency of Kᴀв  and Kвᴀ as the shared secret. 
Kᴀв   = sᴀ[TB  + tᴀ(Rв  + hвPpub )] 
= tвsᴀsв P + tᴀsᴀsвP 
= sв [Tᴀ   + tв(Rᴀ + hᴀPpub )] 
= Kвᴀ 
The final session key will be the output of driven function of this shared secrets and some public/private values. 
 
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
In this paper, we could propose a secure Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol that does not rely on Bilinear 
Pairings. In this section, we introduce our work in detail. Similar to other considered Pairing-Free Identity-Based Key 
Agreement protocols, our proposed protocol consists of four main phases named “setup”, “extraction”, “exchange”, 
and “computation”. 
SETUP. Similar to the reviewed works, in this phase the Master-Key s ∈r ℤ*q  and Params  
< q, �q, E⁄�q  , G, P, PPub , HΌ, H΍  >  will be generated by using the taken security parameter where  HΌ: {0,1}*  x G → ℤ*q and H΍  : {0,1}*→ ℤ*q  (the other parameters in Params are the same as what  have been introduced in the 
previous section).  It is worth to remind that Master-Key will be kept confidential for PKG while Params are 
publicly known to all involving users. 
EXTRACTION.  In this phase, each user such as � who possesses IDi identifier can refer to PKG to obtain the 
corresponding Private-Key. To generate the user’s Private Key, PKG randomly chooses ri  ∈r ℤ*q, then computes  
Ri = ri P  ,  hi = HΌ  (ID i ,R i )  and si  = ri   + hi s(mod q)  then returns  < Ri, si  >  as a Private Key to the 
user. Note that all users such as � who possesses IDi identifier, randomly chooses pi  ∈r ℤ*q,  then computes  
Pi    = pi P  ,  qi  = si  + H2(IDi )pi  ,  and  Qi   = qi P  .  By considering that two users such as A and B, are going to 
agree on a session key, EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases are as followed: 
EXCHANGE. Before applying EXCHANGE phase, communicating participants, A and B, transmit items,  
< Rᴀ, Pᴀ     >    and    < Rв, Pв    >   , respectively.   This transmission occurs one time before the first session key 
establishment.  Afterward, EXCHANGE phase can be performed frequently as followed: 
(1) User A chooses a random tᴀ ∈r ℤ*q, and computes the key token Tᴀ = ((tᴀsᴀ )(sᴀ + H΍(IDᴀ )pᴀ))[Sв + 
H΍(IDв )Pв ] then transfer Tᴀ, Rᴀ, Pᴀ  to the user B. 
(2) User B chooses a random tв ∈r ℤ*q, and computes the key token Tв = ((tвsв )(sв + H΍(IDв)pв))[Sᴀ + 
H΍(IDᴀ )Pᴀ] then transfer Tв , Rв, Pв  to the user A. 
COMPUTATION. In this phase, user A and user B can compute the shared secret as follows: 
A computes Kᴀв   =  (tᴀsᴀ)Tв 
B computes Kвᴀ   =  (tвsв)Tᴀ 
Following equation shows the equivalency of Kᴀв  and Kвᴀ as the shared secret. 
Kᴀв  = (tᴀsᴀ)((tвsв )(sв + H΍(IDв )pв))[sᴀ+ H΍(IDᴀ)Pᴀ ] 
= (tвsв)((tᴀsᴀ)(sᴀ + H΍(IDᴀ )pᴀ))[sв + H2(IDв )Pв ] 
= Kвᴀ 
The final session key will be the output of key driven function of this shared secrets and some public/private values. 
V. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON 
In this section, we compare our proposed protocol with other existing two-party Authenticated Key Agreement 
protocols in the scope of Identity-Based PKC. As mentioned in INTRODUCTION, due to the high computational cost 
of Bilinear Pairings [11,18], recent Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols utilize cryptographic operations over 
elliptic curve based algebraic groups. As shown in TABLE I the required time for computation of ECC-based scalar 
multiplication is at least twenty times less than performing Bilinear Pairing operation [14]. Therefore, in this section 
we focus on comparison of our proposed protocol with related Pairing-free works in the area of Identity-Based 
two-party Authenticated Key Agreement protocols. 
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TABLE I. REQUIRED TIME FOR COMPUTATION OF TWO CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS [14] 
 
Operation Time in milliseconds 
Pairing 20.01 
ECC-based scalar multiplication 0.83 
 
TABLE II demonstrates computational costs of group operations [19]. Here, it is assumed that complexity of 
performing Modular Multiplication is the unit of other operations' complexity. 
 
TABLE II. COMPUTATIONAL COSTS OF GROUP OPERATIONS [19] 
 
Notation Definition and Conversion 
TMM Time complexity for executing the modular 
multiplication 
TSM Time complexity for executing the elliptic curve scalar 
multiplication 1TSM≈29TMM 
TPA Time complexity for executing the elliptic curve point 
addition , 1TPA≈ 0.12TMM 
TIN Time complexity for executing the modular inversion 
operation, 1TIN≈11.6TMM 
 
 
TABLE III. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL AND OTHER EXISTING ONES 
 
Authors Exchange and 
Computation from A entity viewpoint 
Efficiency 
Consideration 
Computational cost unit 
Cao et al. [14] TA    = tAP , TB   = tBP 
K l AB    = s A  T B  +t  A (R B   + h B Ppub) 
K2 AB    = t A  t B  P 
4 Exponentiation 
(Scalar Multiplication) 
1 point addition 
126.12 
Islam et al. [15] TA    = tA(RA  + hAPpub ) 
, TB  = tB (RB + hBPpub) 
KAB   = sA[TB  + tA(RB  + hBPpub )] 
3 Exponentiation 
(Scalar Multiplication) 
1 point addition 
87.12 
Our proposed 
Protocol 
TA     =  ((tAsA)(sA   + H2(IDA)pA))[SB   + H2(IDB)PB] 
TB = ((tBsB)(sB + H2(IDB)pB))[SA + H2(IDA)PA] 
KAB   = (tAsA)TB 
2 Exponentiation 
(Scalar Multiplication) 
2  Modular Multiplication 
60 
 
In continue to what explained above, we are going to compare our proposed protocol with two related works that have 
been introduced before. The proposed protocol by Cao et al. in [14] consists of four scalar multiplications and one 
point addition. In addition, Islam and Biswas in [15] proposed a two-party Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol 
which has only three scalar multiplications and one point addition. TABLE III shows the excellence of our proposed 
protocol in compare with the mentioned works.  As shown in  TABLE  III, our proposed Pairing-free Key Agreement 
protocol is significantly more efficient since it just requires two modular multiplications, two scalar multiplications 
and without requiring any point addition for one of communicating users. According to the mentioned computational 
costs in TABLE II, overall computational complexity of the proposed protocol by Cao et al. [14] is approximately 
126.12 TMM, while overall computational complexity of the proposed protocol by Islam et al. [15] is approximately 
87.12 TMM. However, overall computational complexity our proposed protocol is approximately 60 TMM, which is 
considerably less expensive than the related ones. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, many researchers have tried to propose Pairing-free schemes in order to decrease the overall 
computational cost of Key Agreement protocols.  Several works have been done in the field of Identity-Based Key 
Agreement protocols. In this paper, we propose a Pairing-free authenticated two-party Key Agreement protocol in the 
context of Identity-Based PKC. The results show that the proposed protocol requires less computational cost in 
comparison with existing related works 
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